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Abstract
In this paper, we build a theoretical model to study the effects of automation and
labor market institutions on the labor share. In our model, firms choose between
two technologies: an automated technology and a manual technology. In this con-
text, the labor share reflects both the average wage level (versus output) and the
distribution of firms between the two technologies. Our model offers three main
insights. First, automation-augmenting shocks reduce the labor share but increase
employment and wages. Second, labormarket institutions (relative to automation)
play an almost insignificant role in explaining the labor share. Third, our model
suggests that the US labor share only (clearly) falls after the late 1980’s because of a
contemporaneous acceleration of automation’s productivity.
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1 Introduction
The stationarity of the labor share of aggregate income was a celebrated stylized fact
of the 20th century: although new technologies were continuously introduced, the la-
bor share apparently fluctuated around the same level (Kaldor, 1961; Jones and Romer,
2010). Yet, starting at the late 20th century, a number of authors questioned this stylized
fact and pointed out the decline of the labor share in developed countries including the
US. More recently, new empirical evidence has suggested a sustained downward trend
of the labor share in a wider range of countries, including both advanced and develop-
ing countries.1
In light of the overwhelming evidence of a downward trend in the labor share, the
literature shifted towards understanding its causes. Two prominent groups emerged
within this literature. One group has focused on how technological change (namely,
automation) and the technological structure of the economymayaffect the labor share.
And another group has analyzed the role of labormarket institutions and their potential
interactionwith the technological structure of the economy.2 Parallel to this debate, the
observed increasing substitutability of machines for workers has raised concerns that
machineswill make labor redundant and eventually terminate employment (Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2018). Yet, so far, the empirical results indicate that technological shocks
(either TFP or routine-replacing specific) have not been employment-displacing at the
aggregate level in developed economies (Autor and Salomons, 2018 and Gregory, Sa-
lomons and Zierahn, 2018).
Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing on the interplay between tech-
nology and labor market institutions and contrasting their effects on output, employ-
ment, and wages. In particular, we address two main questions. Is the fall in the ag-
gregate labor sharemainly a technology (automation) or a labor-market phenomenon?
Will machines eventually terminate jobs?
We tackle these questions by developing amodel of technology choicewithDiamond-
Mortensen-Pissarides-style labor market frictions. The model has the following main
features. When entering the market, and after paying a sunk cost, each firm faces two
alternative technologies to produce output. These technologies are perfect substitutes
upon entry: an entrant firm either chooses the automated technology, which is capital
1For earlier contributions questioning the stationarity of the labor share, see, e.g., Blanchard (1997),
Caballero and Hammour (1998), Berthold, Fehn and Thode (2002), Jones (2003), and Bentolila and Saint-
Paul (2003). Formore recent contributions, see, e.g., Bental andDemougin (2010), Elsby,Hobijn and S¸ahin
(2013), Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Oberfield and Raval (2014), Autor et al. (2017b), and Dao et al.
(2017).
2For contributions emphasizing technological evolution, see, e.g., Zeira (1998, 2010), Zuleta (2008),
Peretto and Seater (2013), Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), Autor et al. (2017a), Prettner and Strulik
(2017), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), Cords and Prettner (2019), Le´on-Ledesma and Stachi (2018), and
Martinez (2018). For contributions emphasizing changes in labor market institutions, see, e.g., Caballero
and Hammour (1998), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007), Bental and
Demougin (2010), and Young and Zuleta (2018).
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intensive, or the manual technology, which is labor intensive.3 Each technology entails
a specific start-up cost. The automated technology only employs capital, while the
manual technology only employs labor and requires each firm to search for a worker
in a labor market characterized by an aggregate matching function and where wages
are set by Nash bargaining. In the model, at the time of entry, firms draw an endow-
ment (or capability) from a known probability distribution, resembling an undirected
search process (as in, e.g., Benhabib, Perla and Tonetti, 2017). Eachfirm then combines
this endowment with either technology (although with possibly different efficiency lev-
els) to determine its productivity. Depending on the draw of the endowment, the firm
chooses its technology. Under rational expectations, a no-arbitrage and a free-entry
condition must be satisfied. The no-arbitrage condition allows for the derivation of an
endogenous threshold, i.e., a cutoff level of the stochastic endowment at which firms
are indifferent between one technology or the other. The free-entry condition estab-
lishes a link between the two technologies, so that a sort of complementarity between
them endogenously arises in equilibrium at the aggregate level.4
Ourmodel paves the way to study how automation affects the labormarket inmod-
els with matching frictions. The canonical Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model al-
lows us to study how labor market institutions shape wages (versus output) and em-
ployment. Our model preserves the mechanisms but in a richer context: changes in la-
bormarket institutions andproductivity shocks propagate in the economy also through
the reallocation of resources between firms that choose to operate under alternative
technologies. In this context, the labor share reflects the influence of institutions and
productivity on both the average wage level (versus output) and the distribution of
firms between the two technologies (manual versus automated).
In order to inquire into the effects of increasing automation on jobs, we study ana-
lytically the effects of an automation-augmenting technological change in our model.
We find that both the averagewage and employment increase as anaggregate-equilibrium
result, which is noteworthy given that manual and automated technologies are ex ante
perfect substitutes at themicro level. A rise in the productivity ofmachines incentivizes
the reallocation of resources from the manual to the automated technology, displacing
labor. Yet, in the aggregate equilibrium of our model, the greater expected value to
open a firm induces a significant rise in the number of firms and output that ultimately
outweighs the labor-displacing effect, increasing employment and wages. Thus, in our
3Jones andRomer (2010) cite evidence that corroborates thatmany different technologies are usedwith
widely varying intensities throughout theworld. For instance, in Germany, Japan, and theUnited States, in
steel manufacturing one can observe the use ofminimills versusmodern integratedmills, whereas in beer
production one can observe small family-run breweries versus mass production equipment breweries.
Caselli and Coleman (2006) provide an insightful description of a context where there are two methods
to produce output: one consists of an assembly line where a large number of (unskilled) workers pro-
duce output with hand tools and the other consists of a computer-controlled and -operated facility that is
mainly run by a few (skilled) workers. In our model, we label the former the manual technology and the
latter the automated technology.
4As will bemade clear later on, this complementarity arises in the sense that a technological shock that
augments one of the technologies/inputs will, to some extent, benefit the other one relativelymore.
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model, the aggregate effect is stronger than the reallocation effect, which agrees with
the empirical evidence in Autor and Salomons (2018) and Gregory, Salomons and Zier-
ahn (2018).
As a second step, we calibrate our model to the US economy and compute the sim-
ulated elasticities of keymacroeconomic variables with respect to multiple parameters
of our model. The goal is to study quantitatively how the output, employment, average
wage, and labor share respond to two broad types of shocks: technological and labor-
market shocks. Regarding the former, we distinguish between automation-augmenting
shocks, manual-augmenting shocks and shocks to the relative cost of capital (in our
model, cost of capital versus vacancy costs) (as in, e.g., Hornstein, Krusell and Violante,
2007; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). Regarding the
latter type of shocks, we consider those to the nonemployment income, workers’ bar-
gaining power, matching efficiency, and job destruction rate (as in, e.g., Caballero and
Hammour, 1998; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003; Bental and Demougin, 2010).
Two results stand out. First, an automation-augmenting shock increases the aver-
age wage and employment but reduces the labor share. In our model, the labor share
falls due to the reallocation of activity towards the automated technology, which off-
sets the effect of higher wage and employment. Yet, the labor share does not fall at the
firm level. This result is particularly relevant as it agrees with the empirical evidence,
based on detailed micro data for the US, that points to a (relatively) stable labor share
at the firm level over time (Autor et al., 2017a,b). Second, technological shocks have a
much greater impact on output and the labor share than changes in the labor market
institutions (although the latter have non-neglectable effects on employment). Thus,
in light of our model, unless labor market institutions change massively, technological
shocks are the best candidate to explain a fall in the labor share. All these results are
in line with recent empirical observations, namely for the US (see, e.g., Karabarbounis
and Neiman, 2014; Autor et al., 2017a,b; Dao et al., 2017; Autor and Salomons, 2018).
Finally, we conduct experiments on our model bearing in mind the historical be-
havior of the US labor share, which we depict in Figure 1 for the period 1963-2007. The
real wage per worker grew at a rate close to that of real output per worker until the late
1980s. After that (and especially after 2000), their growth rates diverge. In other words,
the US labor share clearly drops only after the late 1980s (e.g., Elsby, Hobijn and S¸ahin,
2013). Given this evidence, we focus on two time periods: 1967-1987, characterized
by a relatively stable labor share; and 1987-2007, characterized by a falling labor share.
Our goal is to answer three questions. (i) Can our model account for the fall in the la-
bor share in the second period? (ii) If yes, what are the forces that our model proposes
to explain that fall? (iii) Why are the two periods different as regards the behavior of
the labor share? As a calibration strategy, we consider shocks to alternative subsets of
(technological and/or labor market) parameters by targeting the growth rate of output
and wages in the US data within each 20-year period. Then, we compute the changes
in the labor share and employment implied by our model and compare them with the
changes observed in the data for the same time period.
EXPLAINING THE LABOR SHARE 5
Figure 1: The US Economy: 1963–2007
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Note: Both panels plot data for the US economy between 1963 and 2007 downloaded from the FRED
and the BLS. The panel on the left-hand side plots the employment rate of workers aged 25-54 (prime-
age) and the labor share. The vertical axis of this panel measures percentage points. The panel on the
right-hand side plots the output andwage per worker in the nonfarmbusiness sector (NBS). Both series
are normalized to 1 in 1963,meaning that the vertical axis of this panel measures the ratio of each series
relative to its value in 1963. Output per worker is the product of the real output per hour (OPHNFB)
and total hours (HOANBS), both in the NBS, divided by the civilian employment level (CE16OV). Wage
per worker is the real compensation per hour in the NBS (COMPRNFB)multiplied by total hours in the
NBS (HOANBS) and divided by the civilian employment level (CE16OV). This wage is multiplied by the
ratio of the Consumer Price Index (CPIAUCSL) over the GDP deflator (GDPDEF).
Concerning the 1987-2007 period, our model performs remarkably well in two ex-
periments: the combination of automation-augmenting andmanual-augmenting shocks
and the combination of cost-of-capital andmanual-augmenting shocks. In both cases,
the fall in the labor share is extremely close to that in the data, while the employment
rate increases only slightly more. In contrast, experiments that include changes in la-
bor market institutions render disappointing results. As suggested by recent empirical
studies (e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014; Farber et al., 2018), we consider combina-
tions of shocks that involve shifts in the workers’ bargaining power or in both the job
destruction rate andmatching efficiency. These combinations of shocks either increase
the labor share or decrease it at the expense of counterfactual changes in labor market
institutions (e.g., a very high increase in the US labor market flows). We take these re-
sults as indicators that the drop in the US labor share after 1987 wasmost likely caused
by technological changes rather than by changes in the labor market institutions.
Concerning the 1967-1987 period, our model suggests that the observed change
of output and wages was caused by manual-augmenting shocks, and this is why the
labor share did not fall in that period. Contrasting these results for the 1967-1987
period with those for the 1987-2007 period, then it becomes clear that the fall after
1987 occurred because of a significant acceleration of automation-augmenting vis-a`-
vis manual-augmenting technological change. This acceleration concurs with recent
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empirical estimates of capital- vs labor-augmenting coefficients based on closed-form
aggregate-production functions (see, e.g., Acemoglu andRestrepo, 2018, and references
therein) and also with direct evidence on the evolution of the stock of industrial robots
(Prettner and Strulik, 2017).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the liter-
ature closely related to our paper. Section 3 details our model. Section 4 studies analyt-
ically how an automation-augmenting shock affects employment and wages. Section
5 lays out the results of our quantitative exercises. In particular, this section presents
the simulated elasticities of our model and the results of our targeted experiments to
the periods 1967-1987 and 1987-2007. Section 6 discusses how alternative assumptions
affect our results. First, this section shows that, although changes in labor market insti-
tutions do not seem to explain the evolution of the US labor share, our model requires
labor market institutions (in particular, wage bargaining) to fit the US evidence after
1967. Second, it shows that if entry costs are proportional to output, our model con-
tinues to point to the acceleration of automation-augmenting technological change to
explain the fall in the US labor share only after 1987. Third, it shows that if the cutoff
between technologies in our model is technologically constrained, our model contin-
ues to suggest that an automation-augmenting shock raises employment. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 Related literature
As explained earlier, we lay out a model of technology choice exploiting the idea that,
in general, firms face alternative technologies to produce output, be it a good or a
task. The concept of alternative technologies enters into numerous models in the lit-
erature and agrees with the empirical evidence described by Jones and Romer (2010)
and references therein. In several of these models, e.g., Zeira (1998, 2010), Acemoglu
and Zilibotti (2001), Acemoglu (2003), Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Alesina, Bat-
tisti and Zeira (2018), the incentive for a given firm to adopt one technology vis-a`-vis
the other(s) depends explicitly on a firm-specific exogenous feature. This feature may
be interpreted, as in our model, as a firm’s endowment or capability and determines,
ceteris paribus, the firm’s overall productivity or cost level. A related literature, with a
somewhat different approach, allows optimizing agents to choose the elasticity of out-
put with respect to inputs from a set of known technologies; e.g., Zuleta (2008) and
Peretto and Seater (2013). Other papers let firms optimally choose the vector of factor-
augmenting coefficients in the production function from a given technologymenu; e.g.,
Jones (2005), Caselli and Coleman (2006), Growiec (2008, 2013, 2017), Fadinger and
Mayr (2014), and Le´on-Ledesma and Stachi (2018).
From the literature above, our paper is closer to Zeira (1998, Sec. 7; 2010), Alesina,
Battisti and Zeira (2018), and Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), with whom it shares the
simplifying assumption that the manual technology employs only labor and the auto-
mated (or ’industrial’) technology only capital. In Zeira (1998, 2010) and Alesina, Bat-
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tisti and Zeira (2018), there is a final good produced by a continuum of tasks. As new
machines are made available for task production, they raise workers’ productivity and
wages. But firms respond to higher wages by replacing workers (manual technology)
with machines (‘industrial’ technology) in the tasks with the lower cost of machines.
Consequently, these models feature an aggregate production function characterized
by increasing capital intensity and a decreasing labor share. Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018) also devise a model of technology choice and technological change where a fi-
nal good is produced by a continuum of tasks. The authors consider research activities
directed either towards automation of existing tasks (i.e., task production switches from
themanual to the automated technology) or towards the creation of new tasks in which
labor has a comparative advantage (and, thus, the new task uses the manual technol-
ogy). While automation reduces labor supply, the labor share, and possibly wages, the
creation of new tasks has the opposite effects. Depending on the long-run relative cost
of the two production technologies (rental rate of capital versus wages), there may be
an equilibrium in which all tasks are automated (and, thus, the labor share is driven to
zero), or one in which both automation and the creation of new tasks coexist (and, thus,
a positive and stable labor share is attained). The latter may occur because automation
reduces the cost of producing with the manual technology, thus discouraging further
automation while incentivizing the creation of new tasks.
The object of study and approach of our paper differ from that in Zeira (1998, 2010)
and Alesina, Battisti and Zeira (2018). Even though their models provide results on the
effects of automation on the labor share and employment, the authors explore other in-
sights pertaining to different research questions. In this sense, Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2018) is closer to our paper as we share the main object of study. Yet, because Ace-
moglu and Restrepo do not calibrate their model, they only study the theoretical con-
ditions under which different results occur. In contrast, our calibration of the model
allows us to offer insights on the evolution of the US labor share and employment since
1967.5
Looking into other strands of the literature, our paper relates to the ‘putty-clay’
model byCaballero andHammour (1998) and, along different lines, toHornstein, Krusell
and Violante (2007) and Bental and Demougin (2010). Our paper relates to Caballero
andHammour as this paper addresses the issue of the labor share and explicitly consid-
ers a form of labor market frictions. In their model, labor can appropriate capital due
to the relationship-specificity of capital and limited precontracting possibilities, which
are influenced by, e.g., the strength of the workers’ bargaining position and by firing
costs. In the short run, appropriation shocks (due to, e.g., higher capital-specificity or
firing costs) increase wages and the labor share. But these shocks alsomotivate firms to
5In all thesemodels, themechanisms rely on an aggregate production function for the final good, which
ultimately implies a certain complementarity effect between the two alternative inputs in task production
(labor versus machines). In our model, we get a similar effect without positing an aggregate production
function. Instead, as explained earlier, the free-entry condition to open firms establishes a link between
the manual and the automated technologies, so that they behave as complements in aggregate equilib-
rium.
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reduce their exposure to future appropriation by decreasing the labor-intensity of new
production units. In the long run, firms reduce hiring, thereby reducing employment,
the average wage, and the labor share.
On the other hand, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2007) develop a model with
(standard) labor market frictions and vintage capital. In their model, production re-
quires matching one machine (capital) of a given vintage with one worker to yield a
homogeneous output good. But capital-embodied technological change renders each
vintage obsolete and eventually breaks the existing machine-worker match. The au-
thors show that an acceleration of capital-embodied technological change accelerates
capital scrapping and reduces firms’ incentives to create new jobs. This, in turn, shapes
labor-market outcomes, yielding an increase in the level and duration of unemploy-
ment, thereby reducing the employment rate and the labor share. More recently, as a
variation on the topic, Bental and Demougin (2010) explore the relationship between
technology and labormarket frictions in amodel in which theworker-firm relations are
characterized by moral hazard, the allocation of bargaining power between firms and
workers is endogenous, and firms’ investment is irreversible. They focus, in particular,
on ICT shocks that enhance the effectiveness of the monitoring technology, reducing
the moral hazard problem. In their model, these shocks lower the workers’ bargaining
power and, thereby, decrease the wages per effective unit of labor and the labor share.6
Themechanism in our model is closer to the one in Caballero andHammour (1998)
than to those inHornstein, Krusell andViolante (2007) andBental andDemougin (2010),
inasmuch as the former allows for changes in the labor share reflecting shifts in tech-
nology choice (in their case, a change in the labor-intensity of new production units)
as a reaction to given exogenous shocks. Such amechanism resembles the reallocation
between manual and automated technologies in our model. But differently from the
models in these three papers and also the models in Zeira (1998, 2010) and Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2018), our model generates simultaneously a fall in the labor share and
an increase in the average wage and employment. Therefore, our model offers a better
fit to the observed dynamics of the US economy.
Also related to our model, Cords and Prettner (2019) develop amodel with automa-
tion and search and matching frictions. In their model, an aggregate production func-
tion combines high- and low-skill labor with both traditional physical capital and au-
tomation capital (e.g., robots). Physical capital complements both skill types but au-
tomation capital is a perfect substitute for low-skill labor and an imperfect substitute
for high-skill labor. Cords and Prettner use this model to study how shifts in the stock
6Other contributions in the literature focus on alternativemechanisms to explain the shifts in the labor
share. In particular, these contributions exploit the interplay between an aggregate CES production func-
tion and, namely, factor-augmenting technical progress, the relative price of investment goods, structural
change, or increases in market power (e.g., Acemoglu, 2003; Growiec, McAdam and Muck, 2018; Karabar-
bounis and Neiman, 2014; Alvarez-Cuadrado, Long and Poschke, 2018; Eggertsson, Robbins and Wold,
2018). The results of this literature, however, hinge crucially on the consideredmagnitude of the elasticity
of substitution between labor and capital.
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of automation capital differently affect the unemployment and wages of the two types
of labor. Yet, they do not focus on the behavior of the labor share.
Finally, our approach is verymuch in the spirit of the inter-firm reallocationmecha-
nism analyzed by Autor et al. (2017b, App. A). Autor et al. develop a partial-equilibrium
model of an industry where firms have heterogeneous (constant) total factor produc-
tivity and there is imperfect competition in the product market. Each firm produces
output using physical capital and (variable) labor under a Cobb-Douglas technology,
while putting up a fixed cost measured as overhead labor. There is free entry and, upon
entry, firms take an idiosyncratic productivity draw. The authors show that the firms
with bigger productivity draws (“the superstar firms”) are larger as they produce more
efficiently and capture a higher share of industry output. These firms also have a lower
share of fixed costs in total revenues and, thus, a lower labor share, in line with the au-
thors’ empirical results. When there is an exogenous change (e.g., a globalization or a
technological shock) that favors the most productive (larger) firms, the aggregate labor
share falls as the economic activity shifts towards these low labor-share firms. Similarly,
in our model, the labor share mainly shifts because heterogeneous firms reallocate ac-
tivity towards those that are capital-intensive. Yet, our mechanism differs from the one
in Autor et al. (2017b, App. A) in important aspects. Our paper expresses the negative
relationship between firm size and the labor share by making explicit the choice be-
tween manual and automated technologies by heterogenous firms, where the former
entails search and matching costs in the labor market while the latter only entails a
fixed start-up cost. Therefore, our model allows us to take a detailed look into the in-
terplay between technology choice, labor market frictions, and labor market outcomes
(including the labor share), while emphasizing the reallocation mechanism.
3 TheModel
Our model extends the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (henceforth DMP) model as
detailed in, for example, Pissarides (2000, Ch. 1). In our model, firms pay an entry cost
Ω to enter the market and draw a productivity z from a distribution G(z) of productiv-
ity levels over the interval [zmin,∞).
7 After knowing their productivity, firms choose
between an automated and a manual technology. If a firm chooses the automated
technology, it is capital-intensive, bears the (start-up) cost of capital, κK > 0, and pro-
duces zK(z) ≡ zKz units of output using only capital. If a firm chooses the manual
technology, it is labor-intensive and behaves similarly to firms in the DMP model: it
employs one worker, bargains the wage w(z) with the worker, bears the (start-up) cost
κL/µ(θ) > 0 to fill its vacancy, and produces zL(z) ≡ zLz
α units of output using only
labor. zL denotes the productivity of labor, which contrasts with the productivity of
capital, zK . In the labor market, a standard matching function determines the number
of matches. As a result, the job-filling probability, µ(θ) ≡ χθ−η, and the job-finding
probability, f(θ) ≡ χθ1−η, are functions of the matching efficiency, χ > 0, the elasticity
7We interpret this productivity draw as an endowment or capability accessed through an undirected
search process by each firm (e.g., Benhabib, Perla and Tonetti, 2017).
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of the matching function with respect to nonemployed workers, 1 > η > 0, and the
labor market tightness, θ.
3.1 Firms
A firm that draws the productivity z has the present-discounted values JL(z) and JK(z)
if it employs the manual and automated technologies, respectively:
JL(z) = zL(z) − w(z) + β(1− δL)JL(z), (1)
JK(z) = zK(z) + β(1− δK)JK(z). (2)
We assume a common discount factor of β and an exogenous firm-destruction proba-
bility of δL for the manual technology and δK for the automated technology.
Different draws of productivity may imply different choices of technology. A firm
will only be indifferent between the two technologies if its value net of the respective
start-up cost is the same for the two technologies:
βJL(z
∗)−
κL
µ(θ)
= JK(z
∗)− κK , (3)
where we assume that it takes one period for a worker to start production andwe use z∗
to denote the cutoff productivity draw that makes the firm indifferent between the two
technologies. Throughout this paper, we assume that higher draws of z are favorable
to the automated technology relative to the manual one, implying that α < 1. Thus,
for draws of z in the interval [zmin, z
∗], the firm chooses themanual technology; and for
draws of z in the interval (z∗,∞), the firm chooses the automated technology. This im-
plies that the largest firms (which correspond to the firms with the largest productivity
draws and, thus, the largest sales) are capital intensive, as suggested by the empirical
evidence (see, e.g., Autor et al., 2017a ,2017b). To close the firms’ block of our model,
we assume free-entry to open firms:
∫ z∗
zmin
(
βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ)
)
dG(z) +
∫
∞
z∗
(JK(z)− κK) dG(z) = Ω, (4)
where Ω is a sunk entry cost.
3.2 Workers
In our model, there is a measure L of risk-neutral workers who are in one of two states:
employed or nonemployed. If employed, a worker earns the wage w(z), which varies
with the productivity draw of the firm, and loses its job with a probability δL. We denote
the lifetime income of an employed worker byE(z):
E(z) = w(z) + β [(1− δL)E(z) + δLU ] . (5)
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If nonemployed, a worker enjoys income b ≥ 0 and finds a job with a probability f(θ).
We denote the lifetime income of a nonemployed worker by U :
U = b+ β
[
f(θ)
1
G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
E(z)dG(z) + (1− f(θ))U
]
, (6)
where 1
G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
E(z)dG(z) is the average expected value of employment.8
3.3 TheWage
Workers and firms bargain over wages such that the bargained wage maximizes the
Nash product:
w(z) = argmax (E(z) − U)φ
(
JL(z)−max
[
βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ)
, JK(z)− κK
])1−φ
, (7)
where the parameter 1 > φ > 0 measures the worker’s bargaining power or, in other
words, the worker’s share of the surplus. In the standard DMP model, workers and
firms also bargain over wages. Yet, in the DMP model, the firm’s surplus of the match
is merely the difference between the value of employment and the value of a vacancy
(equal to zero, in equilibrium), which ismuch simpler than in ourmodel. In ourmodel,
a firm has two options. The first is that it may not agree a wage with the worker and
search for another worker. The value of this option is βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ) ; that is, the firmmay
invest κL
µ(θ) to find another worker which will generate a value of βJL(z).
9 The second
option is that it may instead threaten the worker it will move to the automated technol-
ogy; in this case, its outside value is given by Jk(z) − κK . Yet, in an equilibrium of our
model, the firmwill only bargain with the worker if it has previously chosen themanual
technology (that is, zmin ≤ z ≤ z
∗). As a result, the value of the relevant outside option
of the firm is βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ) and w(z)must satisfy
E(z)− U =
φ
1− φ
(
(1− β)JL(z) +
κL
µ(θ)
)
. (8)
8Although E(z) depends on z, U does not. z is specific to a firm and, thus, only influences the wage of
a particular job; it does not influence the value of nonemployment. Instead, the value of nonemployment
depends on the distribution ofG(z) in the range that firms decide to open manual firms: [zmin, z
∗].
9In the DMP model, the firm may also threat it will search for another worker. But in that model the
value of this option is zero due to the free-entry condition.
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Making use of Eqs. (1-6), we rewrite the previous equation as
w(z) =
1− φ
1− φβ
b+
φ
1− φβ
[
(1− β)zL(z) +
κL
µ(θ)
(1− β(1− δL))
]
+
βf(θ)
φ
1− φβ
(
(1− β)
[
Ω− (1−G(z∗))
(
J˜K(z
∗)− κK
)] 1
βG(z∗)
+ (1− β)
κL
βµ(θ)
+
κL
µ(θ)
)
. (9)
As in the DMPmodel, wages increase with the nonemployment income, b, the produc-
tivity of the match, zL(z), and with labor market tightness, θ. This equation, however,
is more complex than the one in the DMPmodel due to the mechanism of technology
choice in our model and its interaction with labor market frictions.
3.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is defined at the aggregate level of the economy and is
characterized by the vector (θ, z∗, w(z∗)), which satisfies the no-arbitrage condition, Eq.
(3), the free-entry condition, Eq. (4), and the wage equation (measured at the cutoff
productivity, z∗), Eq. (9). Furthermore, in equilibrium, the flows from employment to
nonemployment must equal the flows from nonemployment to employment. This im-
plies that after the vector (θ, z∗, w(z∗)) is derived, we obtain the employment rate that
satisfies n = f(θ)
f(θ)+δL
.
In the equilibrium of our model, we obtain the output, y, by summing up the pro-
duction of manual and automated firms. To measure the production of each technol-
ogy, we use the product of the number of firms using that technology and their (condi-
tional) average production. We easily obtain the production of manual firms: because
each worker corresponds to amanual firm, there are nLmanual firms, each producing
an average of 1
G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
zL(z)dG(z) units of output. But it ismore intricate to obtain the
production of automated firms as first we need to pin down their number. Every pe-
riod there is a measure of firms entering the market that satisfies Eq. (4). A proportion
G(z∗) choose themanual technology and a proportion 1−G(z∗) choose the automated
technology. In equilibrium, the number of entering firms choosing the manual tech-
nology is f(θ)(1 − n)L, which equals the number of manual firms exiting the market,
δLnL. Because the fraction G(z
∗) of total entering firms corresponds to δLnL manual
firms, there are δLnL
1−G(z∗)
G(z∗) automated firms entering every period. Furthermore, an
automated firm lasts on average 1/δK periods. Thus, there are
δL
δK
nL1−G(z
∗)
G(z∗) automated
firms, each producing an average of 11−G(z∗)
∫
∞
z∗
zK(z)dG(z) units of output. Output in
our model, then, is
y ≡
nL
G(z∗)
(∫ z∗
zmin
zL(z)dG(z) +
δL
δK
∫
∞
z∗
zK(z)dG(z)
)
. (10)
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In our paper, it is essential to define the labor share, LS, which corresponds to the
fraction of output paid to workers. In our model, there are nL employed workers, each
receiving an average wage of 1
G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
w(z)dG(z). Using the expression for output of
Eq. (10), after a few rearrangements, we write the labor share as
LS ≡
∫ z∗
zmin
w(z)dG(z)∫ z∗
zmin
zL(z)dG(z) +
δL
δK
∫
∞
z∗
zK(z)dG(z)
. (11)
4 Will Machines Terminate Jobs?
The rising substitutability of machines for workers has driven the conception that ma-
chines will significantly reduce (and ultimately terminate) employment. Our model,
however, contradicts this conception. We study the effects of an automation-augmenting
shock (a rise in zK) and conclude that a rise in the productivity of machines increases
both wages and employment.
4.1 Analytical Results
In this section, we study analytically how a rise in zK changes the labormarket tightness
and, thus, the employment rate. To ease our exposition and derivations, we assume
that α = 0 (implying zL(z) = zL), but in the next section we show that our results hold
under other calibrations of α. If α = 0, our model closely resembles the standard DMP
model and we can write the wage equation that satisfies Eq. (9) as
w = (1− φ)b+ φ(zL + θκL)− φ
[(
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− κK
)
[(β − 1)f(θ) + 1− β(1 − δL)]
]
,
(12)
which only differs from the wage equation of the standard DMP model because it in-
cludes a third term on the right-hand side. An important implication of α = 0 is that
thewage is independent of the productivity draw z. Thus, the value of themanual tech-
nology JL(z) is the same for all draws of z. Log-linearizing the no-arbitrage condition,
Eq. (3), and the wage equation, Eq. (12), we obtain
θˆ =
A
B
(zˆK + zˆ∗), (13)
whereA ≡ zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK)
(
1− βφ+ βφ (1−β)χθ
1−η
1−β(1−δL)
)
> 0,
B ≡ −
(
φβ
(1−β)(1−η)
(
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK )
−κK
)
χθ1−η+θκL
1−β(1−δL)
+ η κLθ
η
χ
)
< 0, and we use hats to denote
log-linear variables. (See Appendix A.1 for more details on the derivations.) The signs
of A and B imply that a rise in zK will only increase θ if the elasticity of z
∗ with respect
to zK is lower than −1. Thus, we must understand how a change in zK changes the
distribution of resources between the manual and automated technologies before we
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know its effects on employment.
To this end, we continue to assume that α = 0 and combine the free-entry condi-
tion, Eq. (4), with the no-arbitrage condition, Eq. (3), to derive:
zK
(∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
= (Ω + κK)[1 − β(1− δK)]. (14)
At this stage, Eq. (14) already provides an important result. If α = 0, z∗ is orthogo-
nal to θ and w and to all of the labor market parameters and institutions (measured by
zL, b, φ, δL, κL, χ, and η). This implies that the role of labormarket parameters and insti-
tutions is circumvent to the labor market, without any effect on how resources are split
between the manual and automated technologies. In our simulations below, we show
that this result does not hold if α 6= 0. Yet, even in this case, a change in b, φ, δL, κL, χ, or
η has a minor effect on z∗ and the labor share.
Moving to the log-linearization of Eq. (14), we obtain the elasticity of z∗ with respect
to zK :
zˆ∗
zˆK
= −
∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
z∗G(z∗)
. (15)
(See Appendix A.2 for more details on the derivations.) Independently of the distribu-
tion of productivity draws, this elasticity is lower than −1. Thus, if the productivity of
the automated technology rises, by Eq. (13), employment rises.
4.2 Interpretation and Discussion
To interpret the mechanism underlying an elasticity zˆ
∗
ˆzK
lower than −1, we first recall
that the no-arbitrage condition in Eq. (3) links the manual and the automated technol-
ogy at the cutoff z∗. This together with the assumption that the automated technology
is multiplicatively linear in z imply, per se, a reallocation from the manual to the auto-
mated technology with an elasticity of exactly−1. This is expressed by the denominator
and the second term in the numerator on the right-hand side of Eq. (15).10 On the other
hand, the value of the ‘automated’ technology increases with the productivity draw z
multiplied by zK , being z everywhere larger than z
∗ for this technology. This implies
that, by the free-entry condition, Eq. (4), a firm entering the market must factor in the
whole (conditional) expected value of z as regards the automated-technology option
(and not only the value at the cutoff z∗). When the economy is hit by a positive shock to
zK , the average value of the automated technology increases, which reinforces the real-
location of resources towards this technology. This is expressed by the first term in the
numerator in Eq. (15). Consequently, for a given shift in zK , the cutoff z
∗ shifts more
10We note that if the productivity of the automated technology is concave in z, then the effect of the
denominator and the second term in the numerator of Eq. (15) alone implies an elasticity smaller than
−1.
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than proportionally in order to satisfy Eq. (4). In other words, the fact that the value
of entering depends on a non-null measure of z under the distribution G(z) induces a
(negative) multiplier effect in z∗.11
Our result that an increase in zK raises employment is noteworthy given that the
manual and automated technologies are ex ante perfect substitutes at the micro level.
If the automated technology becomesmore profitable following the rise in zK , it is only
natural that some firms entering the market steer away from the manual technology
and invest in the automated technology. In our model, this reallocation effect is cap-
tured by the fall in z∗, which directly reduces employment. Yet, as our model shows,
we should distinguish the implications of automation at the micro and at the aggre-
gate level. In our model, the individual firms’ choices at the micro level give rise to
gross complementary between manual and automated technologies at the aggregate
and general-equilibrium level: an automation-augmenting shock (rise in zK) raises
zK/zL but (by Eq. (15)) reduces the marginal-productivity ratio, zKz/zL, for the firm at
the margin (the one which draws z in the neighborhood of z∗). That is, automation-
augmenting shocks are manual-biased shocks as an aggregate equilibrium result in
the neighborhood of z∗, and, in this sense, there is gross complementary between the
two technologies (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2002).12 Thus, in the general equilibrium of our
model, the rise in zK creates further incentives to open firms (aggregate effect; size of
the economy) which surpasses the reallocation effect.
Our result that the aggregate effect is stronger than the reallocation effect echoes
11The elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK is also lower than−1 for other calibrations of α. To see this, note
that the elasticity in more general terms can be written as
zˆ∗
zˆK
= −
zK
(∫∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
zKz∗G(z∗)− βz∗
∫ z∗
zmin
j′L(z
∗)g(z)dz
,
where we use the definition of jL(z) ≡ zL(z) − w(z) and we assume that δK = δL = δ without much
loss of generality. (See Appendix A.2 for more details on the derivations.) j′(z) is the derivative of jL(z)
with respect to z. If α > 0, j′L(z
∗) > 0 because a higher productivity draw raises the return zL(z) by more
than w(z) (see Eq. (9)). Thus, if α > 0, the elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK is even more negative than
under the case of α = 0. In this case, a firm entering the market must also consider the (conditional)
expected value of z as regards the manual-technology option. The decrease in z∗ induced by a rise in
zK shifts resources from the most productive and valuable manual-technology firms to the automated
technology. Hence, the average value of the manual technology falls, which reinforces the mechanism
described in the text. This is expressed by the second term in the denominator in the equation above. To
return an elasticity greater than −1, αmust be (sufficiently) negative, implying that a higher productivity
draw reduces the profitability of the manual technology. In our simulations below, α = −0.2 continues
to imply an elasticity lower than −1 because, given G(z∗) < 1 (i.e., there is a positive mass of firms that
choose the automated technology), the first term in the numerator still compensates for the second term
in the denominator.
12Other models in the literature also obtain gross complementarity as an aggregate-level result. This
result, however, is usually derived in the context of a closed-form aggregate production function and it de-
pends on the posited features of this function (e.g., Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). In turn, the empirical
literature that looks into the elasticity of capital-labor substitution by explicitly considering an aggregate
(usually CES) production function finds that these two factors are gross complements (see, e.g., Jiang and
Le´on-Ledesma, 2018, and the references therein).
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the empirical results by Autor and Salomons (2018) andGregory, Salomons andZierahn
(2018). Autor and Salomons study the effect of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks on
employment using data onmultiple industries for 18 OECD countries since 1970. Their
results indicate that the direct effect of TFP has been to displace employment in the
sectors in which it originates. Yet, their results also indicate that the direct effect of TFP
is more than outweighed by indirect effects. Namely, Autor and Salomons conclude
that an increase in TFP in one sector generates employment gains in the downstream
customer industries and in other sectors through greater aggregate demand that more
than offset its direct employment-displacing effects. Gregory, Salomons and Zierahn,
on the other hand, analyze the effects on employment of a more specific type of inno-
vation: routine-replacing technological change (RRTC) in Europe from 1999 to 2010.
Still, their findings are very similar to the ones by Autor and Salomons: the direct effect
of RRTChas been to significantly reduce employment (about 1.6million jobs) but these
effects have been offset by the indirect effects of RRTC. They conclude that RRTC has
increased employment by about 1.5 million jobs.
4.3 Graphical Analysis
As mentioned above, our model has a closer resemblance to the DMP model if α = 0.
Thus, under this condition, we can use the typical graphical analysis of the DMPmodel
to gather further information on the effects of the automation-augmenting shock. Fig-
ure 2 plots the equilibrium of our model in the wage-tightness space assuming α = 0.
The equilibrium in this space is obtained by the intersection of the wage equation, Eq.
(12), and the no-arbitrage condition, Eq. (3) (which replaces the free-entry condition of
the DMPmodel). Both equationsmaintain their main properties from the DMPmodel.
In tighter labor markets, workers demand higher wages, implying a positively-sloped
wage equation. Also in tigher labor markets, the hiring costs are higher because of the
greater firm competition for the same pool of nonemployed workers. As a result, in
tighter labor markets, manual firms only attain the same value if wages are lower, im-
plying the negatively sloped curve named No-arbitrage in Figure 2. The slope of this
curve becomes clearer if we rearrange Eq. (3) as
βw = βzL +
(
κK −
κL
µ(θ)
)
[1− β(1 − δL)]− zKz
∗
1− β(1− δL)
1− β(1− δK)
.
This equation also clarifies that the no-arbitrage condition shifts up after a rise in zK
because zKz
∗ falls (aswe have shown in the case ofα = 0). The same logic applies to the
wage equation, also implying an upward shift. Thus, unambiguously, an automation-
augmenting shock increases wages.
5 Simulations: Explaining the Labor Share
Considering the clear evidence of a downward trend in the labor share, a debate has
emerged on whether this trend is mainly driven by technological or by changes in la-
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Figure 2: Equilibrium wage andmarket tightness - the effect of higher zK
Note: This figure plots the effects of an in increase in zK for the equilibrium of our model in the wage-
tightness space assuming that α = 0 and the free-entry condition, Eq. (14), is satisfied. The intersec-
tion of the solid lines represents the equilibrium before the rise in zK , whereas the intersection of the
dashed lines represents the equilibrium after the rise in zK .
bor market institutions. Our model suggests that labor market institutions (relative to
automation) play an almost insignificant role in explaining the labor share. The model
also indicates that the US labor share only falls after the late 1980’s due to the accelera-
tion of automation’s productivity in that period.
5.1 Calibration
We calibrate themodel to monthly US data and summarize our benchmark calibration
in Table 1. In particular, we set β = 0.996, implying an annual discount rate of 4.91%.
We set δL = 0.036, which equals the average job destruction rate in the US from 1948
to 2010 (Shimer, 2012). And to maintain the parallelism between the two technologies,
we set δK = 0.036. To calibrate the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
nonemployment, we draw on the survey of Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and set
η = 0.5. We also set φ = 0.5 and normalize Ω = 1, κK = 1, and L = 1. In the literature,
it is common to fix b ≈ 0.7zL (e.g., Hall and Milgrom, 2008, Pissarides, 2009, and Coles
and Kelishomi, 2018). Based on this, we fix b = 0.7zLz
α
min. To be consistent with the ev-
idence on firm size distribution (e.g., Ghironi and Melitz, 2005, Luttmer, 2007, Gomes
and Kuehn, 2017), in our model, firms draw their productivity from a Pareto distribu-
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tion, i.e., G(z) = 1 −
(
zmin
z
)ξ
, where ξ determines the shape of the distribution. We set
zmin = 0.15 because of the normalization of κK andΩ. To calibrate ξ, we follow Ghironi
and Melitz (2005), who use ξ to target the standard deviation of sales in the US plants.
In our case, this target implies ξ = 3.12.
Table 1: Benchmark Calibration
Discount factor: β = 0.996
Rate of manual-firm destruction: δL = 0.036
Rate of automated-firm destruction: δK = 0.036
Matching function elasticity: η = 0.5
Workers’ bargaining power: φ = 0.5
Labor productivity (elasticity): α = 0
Minimum productivity draw: zmin = 0.15
Power term of the Pareto distribution: ξ = 3.12
Nonemployment income: b = 0.7zLz
α
min
Entry cost: Ω = 1
Cost of Capital: κK = 1
Size of the labor force: L = 1
Regarding the productivity of the manual technology, we start by assuming that
α = 0, implying that the productivity of labor-intensive firms is independent of the
productivity draw (i.e. zL(z) = zL). In our sensitivity analysis, however, we consider
cases in which z improves the value of the manual technology (α = 0.2) and in which
z deteriorates the value of the manual technology (α = −0.2).13 Regarding the remain-
ing parameters, zL, zK , κL, and χ, to increase the comparability of our results under
the different experiments carried out in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we pin down their values
to target (i) the prime-age (aged 25-54) workers’ employment rate, n,14 (ii) the labor
share, LS, (iii) the labor market tightness value, θ, and (iv) the equilibrium proportion
of firms that employ the manual technology, G(z∗). In all our experiments, we target
G(z∗) = 50% and θ = 1.15 The targets of n and LS change according to the simulation.
13Although we have no empirical counterpart of the parameter α, we note that our assumption of a
Pareto distribution (for the productivity draws) bounds its calibration. The Pareto distribution implies
that there is a large mass of firms with productivity close to the minimum productivity draw, zmin. All of
these firms use the manual technology. And, in Section 5.2, we show that the elasticity of z∗ with respect
to zK grows at increasing rates as we increase α. Thus, if α is (sufficiently) larger than 0.2, the elasticity
zˆ∗
ˆzK
is so high that the cutoff z∗ gets very close to zmin and the algorithm that runs the simulations of our
model is unable to converge.
14We target the employment rate of prime-age workers because our model abstracts from demographic
changes.
15As in Shimer (2005), our calibration strategy implies that a different target for θ does not have any
effect on our results. Thus, we simply normalize our target for θ to 1.
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5.2 Simulated Elasticities
In this section, we present the simulated elasticities of key macroeconomic variables
with respect to multiple parameters and under various calibrations of our model. We
study how the output, y, labor share,LS, employment, n, averagewages,w ≡
∫ z∗
zmin
w(z)dG(z),
and cutoff, z∗, change in response to two broad types of shocks: technology and labor-
market shocks. Regarding technology shocks, we distinguish between automation-
augmenting shocks,∆zK , manual-augmenting shocks,∆zL, shocks to the cost of cap-
ital, ∆κK , and shocks to the vacancy costs, ∆κL. Regarding labor-market shocks, we
consider nonemployment income, ∆b, workers’ bargaining power, ∆φ, matching effi-
ciency, ∆χ, and job destruction rate, ∆δL. To make the elasticities comparable, every
experiment refers to a 1% increase in the respective parameter. And, in all experiments,
we recalibrate the model to target an employment rate of n = 76% and a labor share of
LS = 61%.16 Table 2 shows the simulated elasticities of our model under the baseline
calibration. This table confirms the analytical results of Section 4 and offers a number
of other results.
Table 2: Results α = 0
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 5.08 -4.09 0.34 0.44 -2.55
∆zL 0.95 0.41 0.23 1.12 0.00
∆κK -1.85 1.58 -0.13 -0.17 1.21
∆κL -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.00
∆b -0.56 0.11 -0.56 0.11 0.00
∆φ -0.24 0.05 -0.24 0.05 0.00
∆χ 0.30 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.00
∆δL -0.08 -0.41 -0.37 -0.13 0.00
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our benchmark calibration.
All values refer to percentage changes and all shocks are of 1%. Thus, the values in this table may
be interpreted as elasticities. In the first column, we write the respective source of the shock. In the
remaining columns, we write the elasticities of output, labor share, employment, average wages, and
cutoff.
Table 2 confirms that a rise in the automated technology productivity, zK , increases
employment.17 The significantly negative elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK implies
that a rise in zK reallocates resources from the manual to the automated technology,
displacing labor. But, the greater value to open a firm induces a significant rise in the
number of firms and output that ultimately outweighs the labor-displacing effect and
16Our targets are the labor share in the nonfarm business sector and the average employment rate of
prime-age workers in the US from 1963 to 2018. Both series are retrieved from the BLS.
17Our results are qualitatively in line with the numerical findings in Cords and Prettner (2019). These
authors analyze quantitatively the effects of an increase in the ratio of industrial robots permanufacturing
workers on low- and high-skill labor. By calibrating their model with German data, they find that overall
employment rises with automation since the increase in high-skill manufacturing jobs compensates for
the decrease in low-skill jobs.
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increases employment. Table 2 also shows that a rise in zK increases wages but mas-
sively reduces the labor share. In our model, the increase in employment allows work-
ers to demand higher wages and capture a greater share of the match surplus. (See the
graphical analysis in Section 4.3) Yet, the greater employment and wage are not able to
offset the shift of resources towards the automated technology, which implies the fall
in the labor share.18
The fact that the labor share drops in our model after a rise in zK further echoes the
empirical results by Autor and Salomons (2018). As mentioned earlier, Autor and Sa-
lomons conclude that TFP shocks have not been labor-displacing because the indirect
effects have outweighed the direct effects. This, however, is not the case for the labor
share: the direct negative effect of TFP on the labor share has not been outweighed by
the positive indirect effects. Thus, in Autor and Salomons’ data, TFP shocks work simi-
larly to a rise in zK in our model: they both increase employment and reduce the labor
share.
Table 2 also confirms that the labor market parameters do not affect the allocation
of resources between the two technologies when α = 0 because they do not change the
cutoff, z∗. Furthermore, technological shocks have a much greater impact on output
and the labor share than equally proportional changes in the labor market institutions.
For example, a rise in the cost of capital, κK , implies a change in the labor share about
53 times larger than that implied by a rise in thematching efficiency, χ. Thus, unless la-
bor market institutions change massively, technological shocks are the best candidate
to explain a fall in the labor share.19
This result leans against a theoretical literature arguing that the labor share has
fallen in recent decades due to changes in labor market institutions (e.g., Caballero
and Hammour, 1998, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante, 2007, and Bental and Demou-
gin, 2010). We should not, however, take literally our result that changes in labor mar-
ket institutions play a minor role. Our model is simple and parsimonious, which has
its advantages but also implies that it abstracts from other channels. For example, our
model assumes the extreme case that the manual technology only employs labor and
the automated technology only capital (as in Zeira, 1998, 2010, Alesina, Battisti and
Zeira, 2018, and Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). Thus, our model abstracts from the
interactions between capital and labor at the micro level, which influence how labor
market institutions shape the labor share in this theoretical literature. But our model
18As noted earlier, our model features gross complementarity between the two technologies as an ag-
gregate equilibrium result of an automation-augmenting shock (a rise in zK ). In the standard framework
of a neoclassical production function, gross complementarity also means that an increase in the quantity
of one factor implies an increase in the elasticity of output with respect to the other factor; under perfect
competition, this implies an increase in the other factor’s share of output (see, e.g., Bentolila and Saint-
Paul, 2003). Yet, in our model, which departs from the assumption of perfect competition in the labor
market, gross complementarity comes hand-in-hand with a decrease in the labor share in the aftermath
of an automation-augmenting shock.
19Table 2 also shows that labor market institutions have non-neglectable effects on employment but
have limited power to change wages.
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and the models within this theoretical literature also differ in another important result:
the latter models usually predict that the labor share and employment drop simultane-
ously while our model predicts that they may go in opposite direction; this makes our
model broadly consistent with the US experience as we show in Section 5.3. Moreover,
even though simple, ourmodel is in line with another strand of literature. For example,
as argued by Autor et al. (2017b), the fact that the labor share has fallen in countries
with very different labor market institutions points to the existence of other factors to
explain the drop in the labor share. The empirical work of Dao et al. (2017) confirms
that logic: for developed countries, Dao et al. conclude that policy and institutional
factors (including labor market institutions) barely play a role in explaining the fall in
the labor share; conversely, technological channels explain about half. Furthermore,
our results concur with the argument by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) that the
falling price of capital is a good candidate to explain the fall in the labor share.
Table 3: Results – α Sensitivity Analysis
α = −0.2 α = 0.2
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗ ∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 3.04 -2.19 0.37 0.42 -1.44 53.07 -33.99 0.43 0.62 -12.59
∆zL 1.06 0.33 0.26 1.14 -0.05 0.45 0.86 0.21 1.11 0.32
∆κK -1.23 0.91 -0.15 -0.17 0.73 -4.88 4.86 -0.11 -0.15 3.85
∆κL -0.15 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.00
∆b -0.67 0.11 -0.67 0.11 0.00 -0.48 0.10 -0.48 0.10 0.00
∆φ -0.24 0.04 -0.24 0.04 0.00 -0.24 0.05 -0.24 0.05 0.00
∆χ 0.30 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.30 0.04 0.30 0.04 0.00
∆δL -0.19 -0.34 -0.40 -0.14 0.05 0.36 -0.82 -0.35 -0.12 -0.27
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our benchmark calibration
except for the elasticity of labor productivity,α. All values refer to percentage changes and all shocks are
of 1%. Thus, the values in this table may be interpreted as elasticities. In the first column, we write the
respective source of the shock. The remaining columns are divided in two panels. In the panel to the
left, we write the elasticities of output, labor share, employment, average wages, and cutoff assuming
α = −0.2. In the panel to the right, wewrite the elasticities of the same variables but assuming α = 0.2.
Tables 3 and 4 show that our main conclusions from Table 2 hold under different
calibrations of α and targeted G(z∗): a rise in zK raises wages and employment but re-
duces the labor share; and technological shocks have amuch greater impact on output
and the labor share than changes in the labor market institutions. There are, however,
two new and interesting results. Economies with a relatively high α and a relatively low
initial proportion of manual firms, G(z∗), have much higher elasticities with respect to
automation-augmenting shocks.
If α = 0, all manual firms have the same value. But if α > 0, the productivity and
(thus) the value of themanual technology increaseswith the productivity draw z. In this
case, the decrease in z∗ after a rise in zK shifts resources from the most productive and
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valuable manual intensive firms to the automated technology. Therefore, the average
value of the manual technology drops, which reinforces the reallocation of resources
observed when α = 0. (Recall the analytical details in Footnote 11 above.) If G(z∗)
is low, then z∗ is also low and close to the lower bound zmin. This implies a higher
preponderance of themass of firms that operate the automated technology and, hence,
of the (conditional) expected value of z for z > z∗ in the transmission mechanism (see
Eq. (15)). This leverages the effect of a shock in zK , which translates into a greater
elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK .
Table 4: Results –G(z∗) Sensitivity Analysis
G(z∗) = 0.4 G(z∗) = 0.6
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗ ∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 10.19 -8.48 0.34 0.50 -3.47 3.02 -2.20 0.36 0.39 -2.00
∆zL 0.89 0.40 0.20 1.09 0.00 1.03 0.42 0.29 1.17 0.00
∆κK -3.06 2.84 -0.12 -0.18 1.55 -1.17 0.89 -0.14 -0.15 0.98
∆κL -0.15 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.00 -0.15 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 0.00
∆b -0.48 0.10 -0.48 0.10 0.00 -0.71 0.11 -0.71 0.11 0.00
∆φ -0.24 0.05 -0.24 0.05 0.00 -0.24 0.04 -0.24 0.04 0.00
∆χ 0.30 0.04 0.30 0.04 0.00 0.30 0.03 0.30 0.03 0.00
∆δL -0.03 -0.41 -0.34 -0.10 0.00 -0.17 -0.42 -0.43 -0.16 0.00
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our benchmark calibration
but assuming a different target for the proportion of firms that use the manual technology, G(z∗). All
values refer to percentage changes and all shocks are of 1%. Thus, the values in this table may be inter-
preted as elasticities. In the first column, we write the respective source of the shock. The remaining
columns are divided in two panels. In the panel to the left, we write the elasticities of output, labor
share, employment, average wages, and cutoff assuming G(z∗) = 0.4. In the panel to the right, we
write the elasticities of the same variables but assumingG(z∗) = 0.6.
5.3 Targeted Simulations
The evidence by, e.g., Elsby, Hobijn and S¸ahin (2013) indicates that the labor share
started to fall in the US in the late 1980s and, more specifically, around 1987. Given
this evidence, in this section, we conduct experiments to answer three questions: (i)
can our model account for the fall in the labor share after 1987? (ii) If yes, what are the
forces that our model proposes to explain that fall? Finally, (iii) why are the periods be-
fore and after 1987 different?
In our experiments, we use our model to analyze two 20-year periods: 1967-1987
and 1987-2007. To calibrate the model, we always use our benchmark calibration as
specified in Table 1 and our targets θ = 1 and G(z∗) = 0.5. But, depending on the
20-year period, we target the employment rate, n, and the labor share, LS, to those ob-
served at the beginning of the period.20 These two targets imply that the values of the
20The targets for the labor share are 63% and 62%, which correspond to the average labor share in the
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parameters zL, zK , κL, and χ (only) pertain to the 20-year period under analysis. Then,
in each experiment, we consider shocks to three parameters to target the growth rate of
the size of the labor force, output, and wages observed within the 20-year period under
study.21 To target the growth rate of the size of the labor force, we simply impose that
L grows at that rate. But to target the observed growth rate of output and wages within
each 20-year period, we consider shocks to alternative pairs of parameters. For exam-
ple, one of the pairs of parameters’ shocks we use is (∆zK ,∆zL). In this case,∆zK and
∆zL are the necessary shocks to zK and zL that imply growth rates of output and wages
in the model equal to those found in the data within each 20-year period (from 1967
to 1987 or from 1987 to 2007). Finally, the key outcomes of each experiment are the
pairs of the necessary parameters’ shocks that satisfy the targets (for the growth rates
of output and wages) and the implied change of the labor share and employment.
Between 1987 and 2007, in the data, the labor share decreased 3.6% and the prime-
age workers employment rate increased 3.9%. Table 5 shows the results of our exper-
iments for the same period. Our simple model performs remarkably well in two ex-
periments: the combination of shocks to zK and zL and the combination of shocks to
κK and zL. In both experiments, the employment rate increases slightly more than in
the data while the change of the labor share is extremely close to that of its empirical
counterpart. This result adds to the discussion in the previous section: it suggests that
a combination of technological shocks is a good candidate to explain the drop in the
labor share and the simultaneous increase in employment between 1987 and 2007.
We decompose the effects of the shocks to zK and zL in the second and third lines
of Table 5. This decomposition confirms the crucial role played by the automation-
augmenting shock (or, quantitatively very similar, the negative shock on the relative
price of capital) concerning the decrease in the labor share. The decomposition also
highlights the importance of combining∆zK (or∆κK) and∆zL: themanual-augmenting
shock partially counterbalances the strong negative effect of the automation-augmenting
shock on the labor share. Furthermore, we also conclude that the combination of the
shocks does not have the same effect as the sum of the effects of the shocks. As an out-
come of the transmission mechanism of the model, the interaction of the automation-
US nonfarm business sector in 1963-1967 and 1983-1987, respectively. The targets for the employment
rate are 67.7% and 76.4%, which correspond to the average US employment rate of prime-age workers in
1963-1967 and 1983-1987, respectively. The data is from the BLS.
21The target growth rates are the growth rates of 5-year moving averages. The data is all for the US
and was downloaded from the FRED. The target for the size of the labor force is the civilian labor force
(CLF16OV), which grew approximately 55% in 1967-1987 and 29% in 1987-2007. The target for output,
y, is the real output in the nonfarm business sector (henceforth, NBS). We compute this series as the
product of the real output per hour (OPHNFB) and total hours (HOANBS), both in the NBS. This product
grew approximately 101% in both 20-year periods, 1967-1987 and 1987-2007. The target for the wage, w,
is the average wage per worker. To generate this series, we start with the real wage per hour in the NBS.
Then, wemultiply this series by the total hours in the NBS (HOANBS) and divide it by civilian employment
level (CE16OV). Finally, we adjust by the deflators: we multiply this series by the Consumer Price Index
(CPIAUCSL) and divide it by the GDP deflator (GDPDEF). Our series for the average wage grew 32% in
1967-1987 and 42% in 1987-2007.
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Table 5: Targeted Simulations – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
2.85 35.81 – – – -3.22 6.40
2.85 – – – – -15.89 1.01
– 35.81 – – – 11.45 5.84
– 35.96 -5.72 – – -3.26 6.35
– 43.67 – -68.61 – 7.76 18.47
2.73 36.17 – -5.00* – -2.32 7.39
– 42.59 – – 67.70 -5.26 4.16
3.68 33.72 – – -25.00* -2.73 6.93
Note: The experiments regard the period 1987-2007 and all values refer to percentage changes. The
first five columns show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an
asterisk are exogenously imposed in the respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated such
that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages in 1987-2007. The last two columns show
the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the
parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007.
and manual-augmenting shocks attenuates the overall impact on the labor share in
1.22 percentage points (which amounts to about 30% of the total change in the labor
share that would result from the two shocks considered separately). Finally, our de-
composition of the effects of ∆zK and ∆zL also contributes to the discussion of the
relative importance of labor- and capital-augmenting technological progress. Recent
empirical estimates (using closed-form aggregate production functions) point to net
capital-augmenting technological progress, whereas the usual finding in the literature
has been of a net labor-augmenting technological progress (Jiang and Le´on-Ledesma,
2018, and references therein). Our quantitative results indicate an alternative scenario:
although the size of the labor-augmenting technological shock outweighs that of the
capital-augmenting technological shock, the general-equilibrium effects of the latter
outweigh those of the former.
Next, we study the role of labor market institutions. We start by considering the
downward trend of union density reported by Farber et al. (2018), and take this evi-
dence as an indicator that the workers’ bargaining power, φ, may have fallen between
1987 and 2007. Yet, our experiments that include the shock to φ, ∆φ, either produce
disappointing or quantitatively insignificant results. The worst case is when we exper-
iment with shocks to both φ and zK because no combination of these shocks reaches
our targets of output and wage growth (and, for this reason, we decided not to report
the results in Table 5). This experiment, therefore, suggests that the combination of
(∆zK ,∆φ) is not the underlying force behind the evolution of output and wages. The
results are not as bad when we experiment with shocks to both φ and zL, but are still
inconsistent with the evidence: the combination of ∆φ and ∆zL implies an increase
in the labor share and a very large increase in the employment rate. Furthermore, in
this experiment, themodel only matches our targets (of output and wage growth) if the
workers lose almost two thirds of their bargaining power, much more than the fall in
union density reported by Farber et al. (one third; see also footnote 19 below). Finally,
in our last experiment including∆φ, we assume that the downward trend of union den-
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sity led to a fall of 5% of the workers’ bargaining power and again use∆zK and ∆zL to
reach the targets of output and wage growth.22 But this experiment barely changes the
shocks to zK and zL that match our targets (for output and wage growth) in the first ex-
periment. And it only slightly deteriorates the implied changes in the labor share and
employment, suggesting that the combination of productivity shocks continues to be a
good candidate to explain the evolution of the US labor share after 1987.
Davis and Haltiwanger (2014) show that the US labor market has become less dy-
namic: both the job creation and job destruction rates have decreased in the recent
decades. Assuming that this trend has been caused by changes in labor market institu-
tions, we interpret the declining dynamism of the US labor market as a simultaneous
and proportional drop in the job destruction rate, δL, and matching efficiency, χ, in
our model. Then we conduct three experiments. First, we combine the shock to zK
with the proportional shock to both χ and δL and obtain disappointing results: as in
the case of (∆zK ,∆φ), the algorithm does not converge and, thus, we do not report the
results. Second, we combine the shock to zL with the proportional shock to both χ and
δL. In this case, the implied changes in the labor share and employment are very good.
Yet, the model only obtains these results if the labor market becomes much more dy-
namic, against the evidence in Davis and Haltiwanger (2014). Third, we assume that
both parameter values decline 25% from 1987 to 2007 and again use the shocks to zK
and zL to reach our targets for the growth rates of output and wages. The results of this
experiment are very similar to those reported in the first line of the same table. This
suggests (as in the experiment in which we assume∆φ = −0.05) that the combination
of productivity shocks (∆zK ,∆zL) has almost the same firepower to explain the evolu-
tion of the labor share and employment as in the experiment without shocks to χ and
δL.
We take all these results as indicators that the drop in the labor share in the US after
1987 was most likely caused by a change in technology rather than in labor market in-
stitutions, as already hinted by our results in Section 5.2.
But why did the labor share only start falling after 1987? Why didn’t it fall, for ex-
ample, between 1967 and 1987?23 To shed some light on why the labor share barely
22We choose∆φ = −5% by interpreting φ in ourmodel as a weighted average of the bargaining power of
two groups of workers, thosewho are and thosewho are notmembers of unions. Farber et al. (2018) report
that the union density was on average about 18% in 1983-1987 and 12% in 2003-2007. They also report
that the union premium was relatively stable within this period. Absent any other shock that changes
the workers’ bargaining power, we interpret this stability of the union premium as an indicator that the
workers’ bargaining power was also stable for the two groups. This implies that the weighted average φ
only changes due to the distribution of workers between the two groups and not because of a change in
the workers’ bargaining power. Therefore, because φ = 0.5 in our benchmark calibration for 1987, if union
members could capture all the match surplus, φ would fall 7.3% from 1987 to 2007. Yet, this is the upper
bound for at least two reasons. First, it is rather unlikely that workers capture all the match surplus even if
they are unionmembers. Second, Farber et al. report that unions tend to particularly benefit workers who
are less educated and non-white, who seem to have less bargaining power. Thus, we deviate slightly from
the extreme and choose∆φ = −5%.
23The employment rate of prime-age workers increased 12.8% within the same period.
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changed (in the data) until 1987, we rerun the experiments reported in Table 5 but for
the 20-year period earlier. The results are reported in Table 6. Our model suggests
that all of the observed change of output and wages was caused by a rise in the pro-
ductivity of the manual technology. Contrasting this result with the results in Table
5, we get a clearer picture: the labor share did not fall before 1987 because all of the
technological change in that period improved labor’s productivity; and it started to fall
after 1987 because the productivity of automated technologies accelerated. Indeed,
our results point out to a significant acceleration of automation-augmenting vis-a`-vis
manual-augmenting technological change between the two time periods. This result
is in line with recent empirical estimates based on closed-form aggregate-production
functions (see, e.g., Acemoglu andRestrepo, 2018, and references therein). And it is also
in line with the evidence on the stock of industrial robots reported by Prettner and Stru-
lik (2017): industrial robots barely existed until 1983 but their stock grew substantially
thereafter.
Table 6: Targeted Simulations – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
-0.04 28.35 – – – 8.97 7.03
-0.04 – – – – 0.14 -0.02
– 28.35 – – – 8.84 7.04
– 28.35 0.09 – – 8.97 7.03
– 28.31 – 0.39 – 8.86 6.92
– 28.30 – – -0.56 9.00 7.06
Note: The experiments regard the period 1967-1987 and all values refer to percentage changes. The
first five columns show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such
that our model targets the growth rates of output and wages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show
the implied change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the
parameters. In the data, the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
Finally, we check if our results are robust to different calibrations of our model by
rerunning the previous experiments in the cases of α = 0.2, α = −0.2, G(z∗) = 0.6,
and G(z∗) = 0.4. In broad terms, our main points stay intact.24 First, the combina-
tion of shocks to zK and zL and the combination of shocks to κK and zL imply reason-
able responses of both the labor share and employment in the period 1987-2007. Sec-
ond, in the period 1987-2007, if we use changes in labor market institutions to target
output and wage growth, the model continues inconsistent with empirical evidence.
Third, also in the period 1987-2007, assuming reasonable changes in labor market in-
stitutions, the combination of shocks to zK and zL continues to generate reasonable
results. And fourth, the model continues to suggest the acceleration of automation-
augmenting technological change from 1967-1987 to 1987-2007.
24For the full results, see Appendix B.
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6 Other Results – The Effect of Alternative Assumptions
In this section, we compare the results of three alternative versions of our model with
those of our model in Section 3. We reach three conclusions. First, although changes
in labor market institutions do not seem to explain the evolution of the US labor share,
our model requires labor market institutions (in particular, wage bargaining) to fit the
US evidence after 1967. Second, if entry costs are proportional to output, our model
continues to point to the acceleration of automation-augmenting technological change
after 1987. Third, if the cutoff, z∗, is exogenously set, our model continues to suggest
that an automation-augmenting shock raises employment.
6.1 Are LaborMarket Institutions Relevant for theModel’s Mechanism?
The results in this paper suggest that changes in labor market institutions play aminor
role in explaining the drop in the labor share. But, in this section, we show that labor
market institutions are crucial for our model’s mechanism and results. We make this
clear by considering a version of our model in which firms and workers do not bargain
wages; instead, workers obtain a constant fraction of firm’s output: w(z) = φnb zL(z).
Using this version of our model, we rerun the exercises of Sections 5.2 and 5.3.25 This
version of our model cannot account for the drop in the labor share between 1987 and
2007. Moreover, under shocks to productivity and the cost of capital, this model only
matches the targets for output and wage growth for the period 1967-1987 if it allows for
a strong regression of the automated technology (a drop in zK) or a strong rise in the
cost of capital (an increase in κK). Both predictions seem difficult to justify empirically
for that period. Thus, we conclude that the consideration of a labor market institution
like wage bargaining is crucial for the dynamics of our model to be in line with those
suggested by the empirical literature.
6.2 Constant Entry Costs vs. Constant Entry Costs-To-Output Ratio
In Section 5.3, we focus on time spans of 20 years. In such a time span, it may be ex-
pected that entry costs, Ω, are not fixed but tend to grow as the overall economy also
grows (Bollard, Klenow and Li, 2016). Therefore, in this section, we test whether our
results hold in a setting where entry costs are a constant proportion of output: Ω ≡ ωy.
Using this version of our model, we rerun the experiments of Sections 5.2 and 5.3.26
We conclude that our main results in Section 5.3 hold. This version of our model
continues to suggest that the change in the US labor share was most likely caused by
25We report the full results in Tables C1-C3 in the Appendix C. In all these experiments, we use our
benchmark calibration (as detailed in Table 1) except for φ, which is replaced by φnb. We calibrate κL as
implied by the respective exercises using the version of our model in Section 3. For example, we use the
same value of κL to generate the results reported in Tables 2 and C1. Finally, we calibrate φnb together
with zL, zK , and χ to satisfy our targets for employment, the labor share, labor market tightness, and the
proportion of firms that use the manual technology.
26We report the full results in Tables D1-D3 in the Appendix D. In all these experiments, we use our
benchmark calibration and calibrate ω such thatΩ = ωy = 1.
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technological changes rather than by changes in labor market institutions. And it con-
tinues to hint that the US labor share only falls after 1987 because of an acceleration of
automation-augmenting technological change. Yet, this version of our model implies
different results from those we obtain in Section 5.2. IfΩ = ωy, a change in a parameter
that affects output, y, also affects the entry cost, ωy. Thus, the elasticities we report in
Table D1 combine two effects: the effect of the (‘pure’) elasticity reported in Table 2 and
the effect of the implied change in the entry cost. In this context, and contrary to our
previous results, we find that automation-augmenting technological change slightly re-
duces employment and the average wage. The (implied) increase in the entry cost dis-
courages entry. As result, the reallocation effect (towards the automated technology)
dominates the aggregate effect (of greater firm entry), implying the fall in employment.
This result, however, builds on the extreme assumption that entry costs grow pro-
portionally to output, which may be unreasonable as suggested by the evidence in
Bento (2014) and Bollard, Klenow and Li (2016). The empirical estimates in Bento rely
on large cross-country data sets and point to a negative (partial) correlation between
entry costs as a percentage of output per worker and both TFP and output per worker.
In time-horizons of 15 years, Bollard, Klenow and Li find similar results using time-
series data of the present discounted value of profits as a proxy for entry costs. Thus,
both studies indicate that entry costs grow less than proportionally with output per
worker, which is consistent with ourmodel in Section 3.27 Contrasting the elasticities of
our model assuming constant Ω (in Table 2) with those of the model assuming Ω ≡ ωy
(in Table D1), we can see that the elasticity of n with respect to zK is much higher (in
absolute terms) in the former than in the latter. Therefore, if we consider that these ver-
sions of our model are the extremes and reality is somewhere in the middle, then our
experiments continue to suggest that automation-augmenting technological change
very likely increases employment.
6.3 Technological vs. Economical Cutoff
In our model, the cutoff, z∗, is economical in the sense that it is the level of the pro-
ductivity draw, z, for which firms are indifferent between the two technologies, manual
and automated. In the literature, however, somemodels embed a technological cutoff:
in this case, technological constraints stop some firms from adopting (or some tasks
from being executed using) the automated technology. This is the case of the model
in Martinez (2018), in which firms would like to use machines for all tasks but, due to
technological constraints, are forced to also use labor. On the other hand, Acemoglu
and Restrepo (2018) build a model with both an economical and a technological cutoff
but in which only one binds.
In this section, we follow Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), and assume that techno-
logical constraints make it unfeasible for some firms to adopt the automated technol-
27Our starting assumption of a constant entry cost, Ω, ensures that countries more technologically ad-
vanced enjoy greater (aggregate) output per worker, y/n, and lower ratio of entry costs to output per
worker, Ω/(y/n).
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ogy. We denote this cutoff as z∗∗, meaning that only firms with a productivity draw
above z∗∗ may choose the automated technology. To make this case relevant for our
analysis, we focus on the scenario of z∗∗ > z∗. These assumptions simplify our model.
Because we set the cutoff exogenously, we drop Eq. (3) from our list of equations. Then
we find θ and w(z) using the following free-entry condition, instead of Eq. (4),
∫ z∗∗
zmin
(
βJL(z)−
κL
µ(θ)
)
dG(z) +
∫
∞
z∗∗
(JK(z)− κK) dG(z) = Ω, (16)
and the wage equation, Eq. (8).
Using this version of our model, we still conclude that an automation-augmenting
shock increases employment. Because the cutoff does not move, this version of our
model mutes the reallocation effect but keeps the aggregate effect. Mechanically, a rise
in zK increases the left-hand side of Eq. (16), which must be compensated by an equal
fall also on the left-hand side because Ω is constant. Because w(z) is directly indepen-
dent of zK , a rise in zK must increase θ and, thus, employment.
We can also use this version of our model to obtain insights about an automation
shock represented by a fall in z∗∗. In Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018), a shock that makes
it feasible for a greater proportion of firms to use the automated technology reduces
employment. In our model, we find the opposite result. If z∗∗ drops when z∗∗ > z∗,
then the left-hand side of Eq. (16)must increase. And by the same logic as for the shock
in zK , θ and employment must rise for the economy to reach the new equilibrium.
7 Concluding Remarks
The labor share has been falling throughout the world. This phenomenon contradicts
the much celebrated Kaldor Facts and led many researchers to come forward with the-
ories and evidence to explain it. There are two prominent groups within this literature:
those that ascribe the fall in the labor share to technological evolution and those that
ascribe it to changes in labor market institutions. In this paper, we build a theoretical
model to delve into this issue, which we think is a good starting point to contrast the
role of automation with that of labor market institutions in explaining the evolution of
the labor share. In our model, firms choose between two technologies: an automated
technology and amanual technology. If they choose the automated one, they only em-
ploy capital. If they choose the manual one, they only employ labor and behave simi-
larly to firms in the standard DMPmodel.
Our model suggests that labor market institutions play an almost insignificant role
in explaining the fall in the labor share. On the contrary, technological shocks have a
huge power to induce fluctuations in the labor share. Furthermore, we have inquired
into the causes of the relatively stagnant US labor share in 1967-1987 and the falling
US labor share in 1987-2007. Our model suggests that the fall in the labor share coin-
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cided with an acceleration of automation-augmenting technological change (which is
consistent with the evidence in Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) and Prettner and Strulik
(2017)).
In this paper, we also offer insights on how automation shapes employment and
wages. In our model, an automation-augmenting technological change induces two
effects. First, the increased profitability of the automation technology reallocates re-
sources towards this technology, displacing labor. Second, our model suggests that the
shock induces greater firm entry as an aggregate-equilibrium result. This aggregate
effect benefits labor and outweighs the reallocation effect, implying, again, that our
model concurs with the empirical evidence (see Autor and Salomons, 2018 and Gre-
gory, Salomons and Zierahn, 2018).
Our paper also contributes to the public debate on the introduction of a robot tax.
In light of our model, a robot tax can be interpreted as one (or as a combination) of two
shocks: or (i) as a tax on the returns of the automated technology, which is equivalent
to a fall in its productivity, zK ; or (ii) as a tax on the (startup) cost of capital, which is
equivalent to a rise in κK . We have shown that both scenarios increase the labor share
in the model. But we have also shown that both scenarios reduce wages and employ-
ment. Thus, our model suggests that policymakers face a trade-off: if they introduce
a robot tax, they reduce inequality between workers and firms’ owners but they also
reduce the workers’ (absolute) standard of living.
We have chosen to build a simple model, which comes with the benefit of analytical
tractability and the ensuing clarity of the mechanisms at play in the model. But, even
though our model also provides insightful results that are broadly consistent with the
evidence, its abstractions are naturally open to criticism. We have pointed out a few of
those simplifying abstractions over the previous sections. Here, we discuss how some
abstractions of the model may shape the way productivity-augmenting shocks affect
employment. Our model suggests that if productivity continuously rises, employment
should continuously increase and, therefore, asymptotically there should be full em-
ployment. This seems unrealistic and clashes with the evidence that the US prime-age
workers’ employment rate is currently below that observed in the late 1990s. There are,
however, a few abstractions in our model that if alleviated could improve the flexibil-
ity of its results. One is that entry costs may increase with output (even if less than
proportionally), undermining the effect of productivity on employment as we discuss
in Section 6.2. Another is that labor supply decisions – decisions on labor force par-
ticipation and job search effort – may matter.28 In our model, there is full labor force
participation and nonemployed workers always supply the same job search effort. In
reality, however, workers change their labor force attachment and the amount of time
they search for jobs as economic conditions change. As a result, in the presence of high
income and wealth effects, workers may prefer to reduce their labor supply because
28Indeed, labor force participation amongUSprime-age workers has fallen since the late 1990s; seeDaly
et al. (2018) for a recent discussion of this evidence.
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they feel richer when productivity rises. In this case, employment would fall not due to
lower labor demand but rather due to low labor supply.
We end this paper with some considerations for future research. We have just dis-
cussed endogeneizing labor supply in the model but there a number of other exten-
sions that could be considered. One is to build a model that distinguishes between
workers of different skill levels. In this context, machines could be complementary
to high-skill labor and substitute low-skill labor as in Cords and Prettner (2019). This
model would offer insights on, for example, wage premium and how automation af-
fects the employment of workers of different skill levels. Another extension is to build
a model in which labor and capital are complementary at the firm level but firms can
adjust the elasticity of output with respect to the automated technology. As we have
discussed in Section 5.2, such a model would likely strengthen the role of changes in
labormarket institutions as they induce firms to adjust the elasticity with respect to the
automated technology (similar to Caballero and Hammour, 1998). Finally, we can also
change the timing of the model. In the model of this paper, firms choose technology at
the time of entry (either manual or automated). But we can envision a model in which
all firms start as manual and may change to the automated technology later on de-
pending on the incentives (similar to Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018). In such a model,
automation replaces existing labor, whichmay affect how the automation-augmenting
technological shock unfolds in the economy. We will consider the implications of this
extension in a future paper.
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A Analytical Derivations
A.1 Derivation of θˆ
In this appendix, we show how we obtain Eq. (13). Using the definition of f(θ) and µ(θ)
in Eqs. (3, assuming α = 0) and (12) imply
w = (1− φ)b+ φ(zL + θκL)− φ
[(
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− κK
)[
(β − 1)χθ1−η + 1− β(1− δL)
]]
,
β
zL − w
1− β(1− δL)
−
κL
χθ−η
=
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− κK .
Using hats to denote log-linear variables, we log-linearize the two equations above as-
suming that only zK and the endogenous variables vary after the shock to zK :
wwˆ = φθκLθˆ − φ
[
zKz
∗
1− β(1 − δK)
[
(β − 1)χθ1−η + 1− β(1− δL)
]]
(zˆK + zˆ∗) +
−(1− η)φ
[(
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− κK
)
(β − 1)χθ1−η
]
θˆ,
−β
1
1− β(1− δL)
wwˆ − η
κLθ
η
χ
θˆ =
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
(zˆK + zˆ∗).
Defining C ≡
[
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK)
[
(β − 1)χθ1−η + 1− β(1− δL)
]]
and
D ≡ (1 − η)
[(
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK)
− κK
)
(β − 1)χθ1−η
]
, we replace the first equation in the sec-
ond one:
− β
1
1− β(1 − δL)
[
φ(θκL −D)θˆ − φC(zˆK + zˆ∗)
]
− η
κLθ
η
χ
θˆ =
zKz
∗
1− β(1 − δK)
(zˆK + zˆ∗)⇔
θˆ
(
β
φ(D − θκL)
1− β(1− δL)
− η
κLθ
η
χ
)
=
(
zKz
∗
1− β(1 − δK)
− β
φC
1− β(1− δL)
)
(zˆK + zˆ∗). (A.1)
Using the definition of C, we rearrange the term on the right-hand side of Eq. (A.1) to
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− β
φ
1− β(1− δL)
[
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
[
(β − 1)χθ1−η + 1− β(1− δL)
]]
=
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
(
1− βφ+ βφ
(1− β)χθ1−η
1− β(1− δL)
)
≡ A > 0.
Using the definition ofD, we rearrange the term on the left-hand side of Eq. (A.1) to
φβ
(1− η)
(
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK )
− κK
)
(β − 1)χθ1−η − θκL
1− β(1− δL)
− η
κLθ
η
χ
=
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−

φβ (1− β)(1 − η)
(
zKz
∗
1−β(1−δK)
− κK
)
χθ1−η + θκL
1− β(1− δL)
+ η
κLθ
η
χ

 ≡ B < 0.
Using the definitions of A andB in Eq. (A.1), we obtain Eq. (13).
A.2 Derivation of the Elasticity of z∗ with Respect to zK
In this appendix, we show how to obtain the elasticity of z∗ with respect to zK without
assuming any distribution of productivity draws and any value of α. As in Footnote
11, we denote jL(z) ≡ zL(z) − w(z). This notation allows us to rewrite the free-entry
condition, Eq. (4), as
(1−G(z∗))
(
zK
1
1−G(z∗)
∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z)
1− β(1 − δK)
− κK
)
+G(z∗)

β 1G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
jL(z)dG(z)
1− β(1− δL)
−
κL
µ(θ)

 = Ω.
Next we replace κL
µ(θ) using the no-arbitrage condition, Eq. (3):
(1−G(z∗))
(
zK
1
1−G(z∗)
∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z)
1− β(1− δK)
− κK
)
+
+G(z∗)

β 1G(z∗)
∫ z∗
zmin
jL(z)dG(z)
1− β(1− δL)
+
zKz
∗
1− β(1− δK)
− κK − β
jL(z
∗)
1− β(1− δL)

 = Ω.
Assuming that δK = δL = δ, without much loss of generality, and after some rearrange-
ments, we obtain
zK
(∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
+ β
(∫ z∗
zmin
jL(z)dG(z) − jL(z
∗)G(z∗)
)
= (Ω + κK)[1− β(1− δ)].(A.2)
Eq. (A.2) nests Eq. (14). To see this, note that, if zL(z) = zL (α = 0), then jL(z) is the
same for all z. Thus the second term on the left-hand side of Eq. (A.2) is zero and we
obtain Eq. (14).
Using the Leibniz rule, the log-linearization of Eq. (A.2) implies:
zK
(∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
zˆK + zKz
∗G(z∗)zˆ∗ − β
∫ z∗
zmin
j′L(z
∗)g(z)dzz∗ zˆ∗ = 0⇔
zˆ∗
zˆK
= −
zK
(∫
∞
z∗
zdG(z) + z∗G(z∗)
)
zKz∗G(z∗)− βz∗
∫ z∗
zmin
j′L(z
∗)g(z)dz
, (A.3)
where j′L(z) denotes the derivative of jL(z)with respect to z. If α = 0, note that j
′
L(z
∗) =
0. Thus, in this case, the second term in the denominator of Eq. (A.3) is 0, andwe obtain
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Eq. (15).
B Targeted Simulations – Sensitivity Analysis
Table B1: Scenario α = 0.2 – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
1.24 37.13 – – – -3.77 5.79
1.24 – – – – -65.84 0.46
– 37.13 – – – 28.45 5.70
– 37.23 -2.49 – – -3.80 5.77
– 39.19 – -27.07 – 0.59 10.67
1.25 37.45 – -5.00* – -2.83 6.82
– 41.25 – – 54.07 -4.82 4.64
1.50 35.70 – – -25.00* -3.48 6.11
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our baseline model calibrated
with α = 0.2. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes of
the shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously imposed in the
respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of
output and wages within 1987-2007. The last two columns show the implied change in the labor share
and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data, the labor share
fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007.
Table B2: Scenario α = 0.2 – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
1.13 28.30 – – – 8.74 6.81
1.13 – – – – -27.14 0.27
– 28.30 – – – 24.78 6.68
– 28.36 -2.36 – – 8.71 6.78
– 33.38 – -47.63 – 22.22 20.05
– 30.01 – – 23.40 7.98 6.06
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our baseline model calibrated
with α = 0.2. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes
of the shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of
output and wages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and
employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell
0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
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Table B3: Scenario α = −0.2 – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
4.35 34.64 – – – -2.57 7.11
4.35 – – – – -12.14 1.61
– 34.64 – – – 8.95 6.18
– 34.76 -8.72 – – -2.61 7.07
– 40.97 – -59.18 – 6.45 17.03
4.10 35.03 – -5.00* – -1.72 8.05
– 43.79 – – 76.47 -5.85 3.50
5.77 31.90 – – -25.00* -1.86 7.89
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our baseline model calibrated
with α = −0.2. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes
of the shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously imposed in the
respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of
output and wages within 1987-2007. The last two columns show the implied change in the labor share
and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data, the labor share
fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007.
Table B4: Scenario α = −0.2 – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
-1.41 28.44 – – – 9.24 7.30
-1.41 – – – – 2.35 -0.58
– 28.44 – – – 7.05 7.67
– 28.43 3.13 – – 9.25 7.31
– 27.58 – 7.06 – 7.27 5.36
– 26.86 – – -13.80 10.16 8.20
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our baseline model calibrated
with α = −0.2. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the magnitudes
of the shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that our model targets the growth rates of
output and wages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show the implied change in the labor share and
employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data, the labor share fell
0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
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Table B5: ScenarioG(z∗) = 0.6 – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
4.69 33.87 – – – -2.24 7.47
4.69 – – – – -14.61 1.75
– 33.87 – – – 11.30 6.58
– 34.11 -9.43 – – -2.31 7.39
– 41.30 – -68.88 – 8.25 19.01
4.49 34.22 – -5.00* – -1.39 8.42
– 43.82 – – 70.94 -5.93 3.42
6.14 30.82 – – -25.00* -1.45 8.35
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our baseline model calibrated
by imposingG(z∗) = 0.6 in steady-state. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns
show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exoge-
nously imposed in the respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated such that our model
targets the growth rates of output and wages within 1987-2007. The last two columns show the implied
change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In
the data, the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007.
Table B6: ScenarioG(z∗) = 0.6 – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
-0.58 27.57 – – – 9.86 7.91
-0.58 – – – – 1.07 -0.23
– 27.57 – – – 8.90 8.04
– 27.56 1.32 – – 9.87 7.92
– 27.23 – 3.13 – 8.98 7.04
– 26.93 – – -4.86 10.24 8.28
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our baseline model calibrated
by imposingG(z∗) = 0.6 in steady-state. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns
show themagnitudes of the shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that ourmodel targets
the growth rates of output and wages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show the implied change in
the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data,
the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
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Table B7: ScenarioG(z∗) = 0.4 – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
1.62 37.39 – – – -3.83 5.72
1.62 – – – – -16.74 0.56
– 37.39 – – – 11.57 5.41
– 37.46 -3.24 – – -3.85 5.70
– 45.51 – -68.25 – 7.42 18.10
1.55 37.75 – -5.00* – -2.90 6.74
– 41.82 – – 66.31 -4.97 4.47
2.07 36.03 – – -25.00* -3.56 6.02
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our baseline model calibrated
by imposingG(z∗) = 0.4 in steady-state. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns
show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exoge-
nously imposed in the respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated such that our model
targets the growth rates of output and wages within 1987-2007. The last two columns show the implied
change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In
the data, the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007.
Table B8: ScenarioG(z∗) = 0.4 – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
0.08 29.04 – – – 8.40 6.47
0.08 – – – – -0.47 0.03
– 29.04 – – – 8.83 6.46
– 29.04 -0.16 – – 8.40 6.47
– 29.16 – -1.20 – 8.77 6.83
– 29.14 – – 1.68 8.36 6.43
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our baseline model calibrated
by imposingG(z∗) = 0.4 in steady-state. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns
show themagnitudes of the shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that ourmodel targets
the growth rates of output and wages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show the implied change in
the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data,
the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987.
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C The Results of the Model without Wage Bargaining
Table C1: Model without bargain – Elasticities
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 7.24 -4.51 2.40 0.00 -2.55
∆zL 1.57 0.28 0.85 1.00 0.00
∆κK -2.72 1.75 -1.01 0.00 1.21
∆κL -0.24 0.00 -0.24 0.00 0.00
∆b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆φnb -6.14 1.00 -6.14 1.00 0.00
∆χ 0.48 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.00
∆δL -0.75 -0.29 -1.04 0.00 0.00
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our model without bargaining,
as explained in Section 6.1. All values refer to percentage changes and all shocks are of 1%. Thus, the
values in this tablemay be interpreted as elasticities. In the first column, wewrite the respective source
of the shock. In the remaining columns, we write the elasticities of output, labor share, employment,
average wages, and cutoff.
Table C2: Model without bargain – 1987 to 2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φnb ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
0.69 41.71 – – – 6.50 17.09
0.69 – – – – -2.94 1.69
– 41.71 – – – 8.98 16.72
– 41.71 -1.48 – – 6.47 17.05
– 43.43 – -1.20 – 7.95 18.68
-2.80 49.17 – -5.00* – 11.05 22.09
– 41.70 – – 33.38 1.43 11.44
1.82 41.71 – – -25.00* 8.62 19.41
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007using our model without bargaining,
as explained in Section 6.1. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show the
magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exogenously
imposed in the respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated such that our model targets the
growth rates of output and wages within 1987-2007. The last two columns show the implied change in
the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data,
the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007. See Section 5.3 formore details
on the experiments.
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Table C3: Model without bargain – 1967 to 1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φnb ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
-4.42 31.59 – – – 15.96 13.90
-4.42 – – – – 10.98 -8.33
– 31.59 – – – 6.66 17.12
– 31.59 10.92 – – 16.15 14.08
– 28.31 – 2.56 – 8.80 6.87
– 31.59 – – 76.33 -8.13 -9.76
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our model without bargain-
ing, as explained in Section 6.1. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns show
the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that our model targets the
growth rates of output and wages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show the implied change in the
labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the data, the
labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987. See Section 5.3 for more details
on the experiments.
D The Results of the Model withΩ = ωy
Table D1: Elasticities of the Model with Ω = ωy
∆y ∆LS ∆n ∆w ∆z∗
∆zK 1.40 -1.50 -0.05 -0.07 -0.74
∆zL 0.31 0.86 0.15 1.02 0.38
∆κK -0.63 0.72 0.04 0.05 0.45
∆κL -0.05 -0.09 -0.14 0.00 -0.06
∆b -0.18 -0.17 -0.51 0.17 -0.22
∆φ -0.08 -0.07 -0.22 0.07 -0.10
∆χ 0.10 0.18 0.27 0.00 0.12
∆δL -0.03 -0.45 -0.36 -0.12 -0.03
Note: This table shows the effects of the shocks to the parameters using our model with proportional
entry costs, as explained in Section 6.2. All values refer to percentage changes and all shocks are of
1%. Thus, the values in this table may be interpreted as elasticities. In the first column, we write the
respective source of the shock. In the remaining columns, we write the elasticities of output, labor
share, employment, average wages, and cutoff.
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Table D2: Model with Ω = ωy – 1987-2007
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
30.03 43.01 – – – -5.50 3.89
30.03 – – – – -38.68 -3.63
– 43.01 – – – 22.90 4.35
– 44.38 -61.27 – – -6.02 3.32
– 64.99 – -96.27 – 12.29 23.45
29.77 43.38 – -5.00* – -4.55 4.94
– 33.55** – – -96.61** 24.56** 31.81**
31.65 39.08 – – -25.00* -4.24 5.27
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1987-2007 using our model with proportional
entry costs, as explained in Section 6.2. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns
show the magnitudes of the shocks to the parameters. The shocks marked with an asterisk are exoge-
nously imposed in the respective experiment. The other shocks are calibrated such that our model
targets the growth rates of output and wages in 1987-2007. The last two columns show the implied
change in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters.
In the data, the labor share fell 3.6% and employment increased 3.9% in 1987-2007. See Section 5.3 for
more details on the experiments. Note that the algorithm that runs our simulations is unable to con-
verge in the experiment considered in the seventh line (the values are marked with double asterisk),
meaning that the pair (∆zL,∆χ = ∆δL) does not attain our targets for output and wage growth.
Table D3: Model with Ω = ωy – 1967-1987
∆zK ∆zL ∆κK ∆φ ∆χ = ∆δL ∆LS ∆n
13.29 31.88 – – – 6.83 4.93
13.29 – – – – -19.06 -1.29
– 31.88 – – – 18.55 4.89
– 32.26 -29.05 – – 6.59 4.69
– 37.54 – -41.83 – 17.85 15.75
– 198.96** – – -95.76** 37.90** 36.25**
Note: The results pertain to experiments for the period 1967-1987 using our model with proportional
entry costs, as explained in Section 6.2. All values refer to percentage changes. The first five columns
show themagnitudes of the shocks to the parameters, which are calibrated such that ourmodel targets
the growth rates of output and wages in 1967-1987. The last two columns show the implied change
in the labor share and employment (respectively) as a result of the shocks to the parameters. In the
data, the labor share fell 0.7% and employment increased 12.8% in 1967-1987. See Section 5.3 for more
details on the experiments. Note that the algorithm that runs our simulations is unable to converge in
the experiment considered in the last line (the values are marked with double asterisk), meaning that
the pair (∆zL,∆χ = ∆δL) does not attain our targets for output and wage growth.
